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USING ANCIENT MILITARY HANDBOOKS TO FIGHT MEDIEVAL
BATTLES: TWO STRATAGEMS USED BY ALEXIOS I COMNENOS
AGAINST THE NORMANS AND THE PECHENEGS
During the whole of his lengthy reign, Alexios I Comnenos (1081`1118)
faced multiple military threats from many different opponents that seriously
threatened the cohesion and the existence of the empire. The Seljuk Turks, the
Pechenegs, the Cumans, the Normans and several Turkish principalities of Asia
Minor tried to exploit the dire position in which the Byzantine Empire had
fallen during the fifty years that preceded Alexios reign. Alexios’ campaigns
against all these enemies, sometimes fought with limited resources and often
having to cope with strategic disadvantage, have been sufficiently studied by
modern scholars1. This article is a result of the study and analysis of some of
the stratagems cleverly used by the emperor during his campaigns and the iden`
tification of their correlation to similar stratagems as they have been recorded
in Ancient sources, specifically those concerning wagons and carts2. The in`
terrelation between Ancient and Byzantine stratagems can provide useful con`
clusions about the theoretical military training of the Byzantine senior officials
and the significance of Ancient military texts and sources in Byzantine battle
theory.
Until the eleventh century, the only people using wagons as weapons of war
were the Nomads, usually of Turkish origin3. For centuries, these people located
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1. This paper is focused solely on specific military actions during the reign of Alexios I. For a de`
tailed and thorough analysis of the campaigns and major military events of his reign, see J. F.
HALDON, The Byzantine Wars: Battles and Campaigns of the Byzantine Era, Charleston 2000
(hereafter: HALDON, Byzantine Wars). Also, see J. BIRKENMEIER, The development of the Kom`
nenian army, Leiden 2002, p. 56`84 (hereafter: BIRKENMEIER, Development).
2. In this article, the terms “wagon” and “cart” refer to four`wheeled carts, like those used by mer`
chants and the Nomads, rather than two`wheeled chariots, like those used in ancient times (Bib`
lical and Homeric era) and the Celtic world, or the scythed chariots of Classical and Hellenistic
times. Alexios used his wagons both as offensive as well as defensive devices, according to the
specific situation and opponent.
3. The term Nomad is usually used collectively to characterize various Hunnic tribes, the Khazar
confederacy and later on the Pechenegs, the Magyars and the minor Türkmen Nomad tribes,
which accompanied the early Seldjuk Turks during their invasion and occupation of Asia Minor,
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at the nothern and eastern borders of the empire used wagon carts for their
transportation as well as for their security4. The Byzantine writers circum`
scribing the conflicts of the Byzantine army and the Nomads frequently men`
tion the large wagon circles (or ‘wagon laagers’) of the latter. These were used
as defensive obstacles or forts for the protection of their families and livestock
and even as strongpoints which could be also used as a shelter to accomplish a
reorganization of the army in case of defeat, althought the wagons were vul`
nerable during open field fights, in which the Byzantine forces excelled5. As a
matter of fact, the significance of the wagons for the Nomads was such that
many tribes used to name themselves after them6.
The tactics used by the Nomad people had a great impact and influence on
the way the Romans and Byzantines waged their wars. The Byzantines adopted
many elements from the Nomads, both in terms of tactics and weaponry7. They
came to terms with a different, more agile style of warfare, in which the use of
light`armed cavalry played the most prominent role. The Nomad light`armed
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from the middle of the eleventh century onwards. Due to time and subject limitations, this ar`
ticle will not analyse these tribes. For more details about these people, see S. DENIS (ed.), The
Cambridge History of Early Inner Asia, Cambridge 1990 and E. HILDINGER, Warriors of the
Steppe: A Military History of Central Asia, 500 B.C. to 1700 A.D., Cambridge 2001.
4. There are many references from Byzantine chroniclers and historians on the major role these
vehicles played in the everyday life of these Nomads. See LEO DIACONUS, Historiae libri decem,
ed. C. B. HASE, Bonnae1828, p. 15716`18 and ANNA COMNENA, Alexias, ed. D. R. REINSCH – A.
KAMBYLIS [Corpus Fontium Historiae Byzantinae 40/1], Berlin – New York 2001, p. 4507`8 (here`
after: ANNA COMNENA).
5. MATTHEW OF EDESSA, Chronique, ed. E. DULAURIER, Paris 1858, p. 200; ANNA COMNENA, p.
23184`89; p. 24767`69. Choniates and Kinnamos, while offering a vivid description of the battle of
Verrhoe (1122), also make special mention of the defensive character of wagon circles used by
the Pechenegs. See NICETAS CHONIATES, Historia, ed. J.`L. VAN DIETEN [Corpus Fontium Histo`
riae Byzantinae 11/1], Berlin – New York 1975, p. 1462`1614, and JOHN CINNAMUS, Epitome
rerum ab Ioanne et Alexio Comnenis gestarum, ed. A. MEINEKE, Bonnae1836, p. 715`822.
6. I. VÁSÁRY, Cumans and Tatars: Oriental Military in the Pre`Ottoman Balkans, 1185`1365, Cam`
bridge 2005, p. 8 (hereafter: VÁSÁRY, Cumans and Tatars); P. B. GOLDEN, Khazar Studies:
Achievements and Perspectives, in: The World of the Khazars. New Perspectives, P. B. GOLDEN –
H. BEN`SHAMMAI – A. RONÁ`TAS (eds.) [Handbook of Oriental Studies/Handbuch der Oriental`
istik, Section Eight, Central Asia, 17], Brill, Leiden – Boston 2007, p. 7`57, here p.14, n. 33.
7. J. F. HALDON, Some aspects of Byzantine military technology from the sixth to the tenth cen`
turies, Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies 1 (1975) 11`47; H. R. ROBINSON, Oriental Armour,
London 1967, p. 54`56. For the impact of Pecheneg (nomad) tactics upon Byzantine military
strategy and tactics, especially during the reign of Alexios I, see V. SPINEI, The great migrations
in the East and South East of Europe from the ninth to the thirteenth century, v. I: Hungari`
ans, Petchenegs and Uzes, Amsterdam 2006, p. 208 (hereafter: SPINEI, Migrations).
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cavalry used the composite bow as their primary weapon and applied guerilla
tactics, such as ambushes, and other stratagems in order to dominate more
heavily armed opponents8. The lengthy campaigns and bloody battles against
the Pechenegs and the Cumans during the latter half of the eleventh century
and the first half of the twelfth century was the culmination of the long armed
confrontation between the Byzantines and the peoples of the steppe. The defeats
suffered by Alexios and his predecessors at the hands of these technologically
inferior opponents had deep impact on the re`evaluation and transformation of
Byzantine battle tactics9. The use of wagons10 in stratagems against the Nor`
mans and the Nomads, people with a vastly different military philosophy, is not
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8. VÁSÁRY, Cumans and Tatars, p. 55`56; A. KARASULAS, Mounted archers of the steppe, 600 B.C.–
A.D. 1300, Osprey Publishing, Oxford 2004. This peculiar way of fighting is vividly described
in the older Byzantine military manuals and is characterized as the predominant style of fight`
ing excercised among the earlier hunnic tribes. See MAURIKIOS, Strategikon, ed. G. T. DENNIS
[Corpus Fontium Historiae Byzantinae 17], Wien 1981, IV.2 (p. 194) and XI.2 (p. 360`368)
(hereafter: MAURIKIOS).
9. Alexios used nomadic guerilla tactics, propably ispired by his contacts with the Pechenegs,
against his western and most dangerous foe, the Normans. Throughout the Alexiad, there are
many references to stratagems and ambushes used by Alexios against the Normans, the Cru`
saders and sometimes even against the Pechenegs and the Cumans. He incorporated elements
of the traditional fighting tactics of the Nomads in the Byzantine battle tactics and subse`
quently used them against his other foes. In this way he acted according to the advice of the
Byzantine military manuals.
10. The use of wagons and carts for strict military purposes and not for the transportation of sup`
plies and military personel and gear might sound peculiar when someone comes to terms with
the Byzantine military philosophy even though there were some extraordinary cases from the
early Byzantine period in which the Byzantines used the wagons as defensive stockades for the
protection of the army as well as non`combat elements, no doubt imitating the practices of the
Nomads. See PROCOPIUS, History of the wars, ed. J. HENDERSON, trans. H. B. DEWING [Loeb Clas`
sical Library 107], London 1924, VI.5.3, p. 328 (hereafter: PROCOPIUS). Also, see CH. DE BOOR,
Excerpta historica iussu Imp. Constantini Porphyrogeniti (Excerpta de Insidiis), v. III, Berlin
1905, p. 144`145; C. MÜLLER, Fragmenta Historicorum Graecorum, v. V, Paris 1873, fr. 214e.7,
p. 33 (John of Antioch’s description of the battle between Hunnic war bands and the Byzan`
tine army under the leadership of Hypatios in 514`515. The Byzantines fought behind a wagon
wall, probably in an effort to withstand the impact of the deadly Hunnic archery. Nevertheless,
they lost the battle). Also, see V. SPINEI, The Romanians and the Turkic Nomads North of the
Danube Delta from the Tenth to the Mid`Thirteenth Century, Leiden 2009, p. 221. The Latin
term carrago (καραγός) is sometimes used in the Byzantine military manuals to describe the
formation of the army’s supply caravan but sometimes also has the meaning of a defensive
wagon laager, such as the laagers used by the Nomads. See MAURIKIOS, ΧΙΙ Β, 18.1`21 (p. 454`
456) and ΧΙΙ B, 22 (p. 472); LEO THE WISE, Taktika, ed. and trans. G. T. DENNIS [Dumbarton
Oaks Texts 12], Washington, D.C. 2010, IV.55, p. 62 (hereafter: LEO, Taktika).
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irrelevant to the experience Alexios gained by watching and fighting these peo`
ple. As we shall see, those stratagems were not simply mere inspirations of the
moment or derivatives of the emperor’s military knowledge and expertise, but
mostly strict applications of the theories and deductions of Ancient and early
Byzantine military tacticians and historians, the works of whom survived up
to the middle Byzantine period, whether identical to the prototypes or as frag`
mentary medieval revisions.
According to the sources, Alexios Comnenos used wagons as offensive and
defensive weapons against his foes in two cases. The first one was during the
long and hard`fought war with the Normans, in a minor engagement that took
place in 1082, outside the walls of the city of Ioannina11, then at the hands of
the Normans of Bohemond12. The second one was during the skirmishing be`
tween the Byzantine and Pecheneg forces just outside the walls of the castle of
Tzurulos in 109013. A detailed description and analysis of those stratagems fol`
lows forthwith.
During the first event, which according to Anna Comnene took place at the
spring of 1082, Alexios moved from Constantinople against Bohemond, the
son of Robert Guiscard14, which had set camp outside the city of Ioannina15. On
the outskirts of the city a battle took place, the outcome of which was, despite
the very best efforts of Anna Comnena to conceal it, negative for Alexios16.
One major challenge faced by Alexios was the Norman heavy cavalry and
specifically its famous charge, which according to Anna’s own words was un`
rivalled and as Alexios had found out some months earlier at the battle of
Dyrrachium (18 October 1081), had a crippling effect on the morale of his own
troops17. The emperor knew that a direct confrontation with the Norman heavy
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11. ANNA COMNENA, p. 14964`15082; WILLIAM OF APULIA, La Geste de Robert Guiscard, ed. and
trans. M. MATHIEU [Istituto siciliano di studi bizantini e neoellenici, Testi e monumenti, Testi
4], Palermo 1961, V.6`7, p. 236 (hereafter: Gesta Wiscardi).
12. ANNA COMNENA, ibid.; BIRKENMEIER, Development, p. 66`67 (Birkenmeier erroneously places
the event as having taken place in 1108).
13. ANNA COMNENA, p. 23218`23469; BIRKENMEIER, Development, p. 75.
14. Bohemond de Hauteville. About him, see R. B. YEWDALE, Bohemond I, Prince of Antioch,
Princeton 1917; J. G. ROWE, Paschal II, Bohemund of Antioch and the Byzantine Empire, BulH
letin of the John Rylands Library 49 (1966`1967) 165`202; J. FLORI, Bohémond d’Antioch,
Chevalier d’Aventure, Paris 2007.
15. P. SOUSTAL – J. KODER, Nikopolis und Kephallēnia [Tabula Imperii Byzantini 3], Verlag der
Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Wien 1981, p.165`167.
16. It seems, though, that his casualties were very light and this defeat had not any major affect
upon the general course of the military operations.
17. For the battle of Dyrrachium, see ANNA COMNENA, p. 13167`14033; HALDON, Byzantine Wars
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cavalry was out of question and consequently resorted to skirmishing tactics.
He had noticed that such tactics were harmful and tiresome for his enemies, so
he tried to even the odds by using a peculiar stratagem. He built lighter and
smaller wagons than the usual ones (ἁµάξας κουφοτέρας καὶ ἥττους τῶν
συνήθων), whose exact number remains unknown, and attached to every one
of them four spears (κόντους)18. He also attached four foot soldiers as guards
and operators of the spears to each of them. His purpose was to place the wag`
ons in a line in front of the Byzantine formation, so that at the moment of a
Norman charge, the foot soldiers would push these wagons forward and force
the Normans to loosen or even break their tight formation in order to avoid
them, as it would be suicidal for them to charge against/into a wall of spears19.
Thus, the Byzantines would force the Normans to lose their momentum, so that
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p. 134`137; BIRKENMEIER, Development, p. 62`66. The comments of Anna Comnene about the
charge of the Norman heavy cavalry and the psychological impact it had on the enemy troops
(in this case the Byzantines) are worth mentioning. According to the author (ANNA COMNENA,
p. 33948`58 and 40523`40629), the Norman knight (Κελτὸς ἀνήρ) ἔποχος µὲν ἀκατάσχετος καὶ
κἂν τεῖχος διατετρήνειε Βαβυλώνιον, ἀποβεβηκὼς δὲ τοῦ ἵππου ἄθυρµα τοῖς ἐθέλουσι γίνεH
ται. For the Norman heavy cavalry, see D. NICOLLE, The Normans, Osprey Publishing, Oxford
1987; C. GRAVETT, The Normans: Warrior Knights and Their Castles, Osprey Publishing, Ox`
ford 2007, p. 72`111; IDEM, Norman knight AD 950`1204, Osprey Publishing, Oxford 1993; see
also R. H. C. DAVIES, The warhorses of the Normans, AngloHNorman Studies 10 (1988) 67`82.
18. ANNA COMNENA, p. 14964`15082. Anna uses the term κόντος in order to describe those spears,
a term usually used to manifest the spear used by the cavalry, and not the term δόρυ which
refers to the spears used by the infantry. Alexios may indeed have used cavalry and not in`
fantry spears on his wagons, something peculiar because the Byzantines possesed at least one
specialized anti`cavalry infantry unit, the so`called menavlatoi. See E. MCGEER, Μεναύλιον `
Μεναυλάτοι, ∆ίπτυχα 4 (1986`1987) 53`57 (hereafter: MCGEER, Μεναύλιον); IDEM, Infantry
versus cavalry: the Byzantine response, Revue des Études Byzantines 46 (1988) 135`145. The
menavlatoi are mentioned in every Byzantine military manual until the end of the tenth cen`
tury but seldom in other historical sources. One question that rises is why Alexios did not use
them against the vaunted Norman cavalry. Alexios repeatedly used skirmishing tactics and a
variety of stratagems, but, according to Anna Comnene and other sources, he never used spe`
cial infantry units against cavalry. Perhaps his troops mostly consisted of cavalry and thus it
was reasonable for him to use cavalry spears. A closer look at the general actions of Alexios on
the battlefield suggests that monavlatoi and other specialized anti`cavalry infantry units had
eclipsed from the ranks of the armies of the Comnenian emperors, possibly even earlier than
his reign, probably because of the high upkeeping costs and the special, time`consuming train`
ing during periods of low troop availability.
19. When Alexios deployed his special wagons, perhaps he had in mind a sixth`century treatise, the
so`called Οὐρβικίου Ἐπιτήδευµα. See G. GREATREX – H. ELTON – R. BURGESS, Urbicius’ Epit`
edeuma: an edition, translation and commentary, Byzantinische Zeitschrift 98 (2005) 35`74 (p.
55`58 contain the ancient text). This treatise gives advice on how to counter the Persian heavy
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they would become an easy prey for the more mobile Byzantine troops. Never`
theless, the progress of the battle did not fulfill the Byzantine expectations. The
Normans, under the leadership of Bohemond20, simply went around the wagons
without loosing their cohesion and impetus. The Byzantines lost the battle de`
spite the personal bravery and the heroic deeds of Alexios21.
William’s of Apulia narrative largely agrees with that of Anna Comnene, al`
though it is considerably briefer and slightly varied22. According to William,
Alexios placed the wagons in front of his camp, which faced the plain, in order
to block the places suitable for the advance of the Norman cavalry23. He does
not mention any details about these wagons, but he adds the information that
Alexios placed caltrops in defense of his own camp24. But the most significant
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cavalry by using heavy spears (κανόνες) attached on the ground with the help of iron nails and
thus form a kind of spear wall (though it is not quite clear how these devices were exactly used).
It is not improbable that Alexios had knowledge of Urbicius’ devices, although in his case the
army, in contrast to the armies of the sixth century, was mostly composed of cavalry. Alexios
decided to place the spears on the wagons and not to fix them on the ground. It is also plausi`
ble to assume that he made some kind of combination of Ancient stratagems and the EpitH
edeuma in order to face the Norman cavalry, as also described later on in this article. LEO,
Taktika, XI.22, p. 204, also mentions a special use of the menavlion as a static defensive weapon
against heavy cavalry, similar in its use with that of caltrops. This special use was introduced
during a campaign against the Bulgarian army in 894 by Nicephoros Phokas, the grandfather
of the homonymous emperor. The menavlion was placed upon wooden sticks tied together in a
way that resembles the Greek letter lamda (Λ). The whole device was similar to a tripod. Ob`
viously, such devices had limited functionality and could only be effectively used in great num`
bers. It was a simple and easy way to delay the enemy cavalry attack but it could do little to
repulse a well`coordinated and determined assault. It is possible that Alexios was inspired by
these devices when he was looking for a way to fight the Norman cavalry (MCGEER, Μεναύλιον,
p. 54`55); IDEM, Tradition and Reality in the Taktika of Nikephoros Ouranos, Dumbarton Oaks
Papers 45 (1991) 129`140 (especially 134`135); M. ANASTASIADIS, On handling the menavlion,
Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies 18 (1994) 1`10.
20. It seems that Bohemond was a talented and gifted military leader, a perfect match to Alexios
in terms of craftiness and deceitfulness. The Normans, contrary to the widely accepted view,
made extended use of military tricks and ruses: see E. ALBU, Bohemond and the Rooster: Byzan`
tines, Normans and the Artful Ruse, in: Anna Komnene and her Times, THALIA GOUMA`PE`
TERSON (ed.), New York 2000, p. 157`168.
21. ANNA COMNENA, p. 15083`15116. The Norman knights charged the Byzantines, which quickly
lost cohesion and turned to flight. The Byzantine casualties were very light, though, and soon
Alexios was able to rally his scattered troops.
22. Gesta Wiscardi, V.4`19, p. 236.
23. Ibid., V.8`10, p. 236`237: multiplici partem praemunit Alexius illam obice plaustrorum, quam
pervia planiciei ad pervadendam facilem vicinia reddit.
24. Ibid., V.11`13, p. 236`237. Anna Comnene, in contrast, places the use of caltrops in another bat`
tle fought some days latter (ANNA COMNENA, p. 15116`15251).
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information given by William is that the careful plan of Alexios was ruined
not by the Norman cleverness and anticipation but from the fog which gave
cover to the Norman flanking manoeuvres, through rough terrain, vineyards
and crops25.
According to Anna Comnene, during the second event, Alexios was cut off
at Tzurulos26 by a large force of Pecheneg warriors27, without any hope of being
relieved in time. So he resorted to another ruse in order to counter the numer`
ical superiority of the Nomads. He removed from all the carriages that hap`
pened to be in the castle the pairs of the wheels along with their axes and
suspended them by means of thick ropes from the outer section of the walls,
leaving them to hover over the direction of the plain28. The Pechenegs had set
their own camp at the foothill, in order to lay siege to the castle29. The next day,
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25. Gesta Wiscardi, V.14`16, p. 236: at nebula Danaum prospectus praepediente, illuc Normanni
per vitibus aspera densis plenaque carectis loca pervenere latenter.
26. About Tzurulos (modern Čorlu), a fortress city in eastern Thrace, west of Selymbria and east
of Rhaidestos, see A. KÜLTZER, Ostthrakien [Tabula Imperii Byzantini 12], Verlag der Öster`
reichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Wien 2008, p. 684`688; C. J. JIREČEK, Die Heer`
strasse von Belgrad nach Constantinopel und die Balkanpässe, Prag 1877, p. 51, 101 (there is
a mention of Alexios’ stratagem). The castle was built on a hill which supervised the area and
it was very difficult to lay siege on it. There was only a narrow uphill entrance.
27. For the Pechenegs in general, see P. DIACONU, Les Petchénègues au Bas`Danube [Bibliotheca
Historica Romaniae 27], Bucharest 1970; SPINEI, Migrations, p. 133`227. O. PRITSAK, The Petch`
enegs, a case of a social and economic transformation, Archivum Eurasiae Medii Aevi 1 (1975)
211`235; A. PÁLÓCZI`HORVÁTH, Pechenegs, Cumans, Iasians: Steppe peoples in medieval Hun`
gary, Budapest 1989.
28. ANNA COMNENA, p. 23222`29: Ἀναλαβόµενος τὰς τῶν οἰκητόρων ἁµάξας καὶ ταύτας ἀφελὼν
ἀπὸ τῶν ἐπικραββάτων τούς τε τροχοὺς καὶ τοὺς ἄξονας ἄνω κατέσχε κᾆθ‘ οὕτως ἔξω τοῦ
τείχους ἐπὶ τῶν κρηδέµνων ἐφεξῆς ἀπαιωρεῖ διά τινων καλῳδίων ἐναποδεσµουµένων ταῖς
ἐπάλξεσι τῶν τειχῶν. Καὶ ἅµα τε τοῦτο ἐνενόησε καὶ εἰργάσατο. Καὶ µιᾶς ὥρας ἐναH
πεκρέµαντο κύκλῳ οἱ τροχοὶ µετὰ τῶν ἀξόνων ὥσπερ τινὲς ἐφεξῆς κύκλοι κείµενοι καὶ
ἀλλήλοις ἐγγίζοντες καὶ τοῖς ἄξοσιν αὐτῶν ξυνδεσµούµενοι. It is not clear whether this ruse
was conceived by the emperor himself or one of his senior officers. We should always keep in
mind that Anna Comnene exaggerates the exploits of her father, sometimes at the expense of the
historical truth. It could even be argued that the whole narrative is fictional, an attempt on be`
half of Anna Comnene to hide her father’s early defeats and a chance to praise his prowess and
craftiness, especially in cases when the odds were against him (her remarkable classical educa`
tion and scholarliness would make such a feat quite possible). However, for reasons that shall be
analyzed further below, the writer’s personal opinion is that the ruse corresponds to a real event.
29. Ibid., p. 23218`20. Contrary to their military customs and tactics, the Pechenegs set their camp
on a seemingly vulnerable position downhill. This speaks volumes about the military strength
of the two opponents. Obviously Alexios was heavily outnumbered and the Nomads did not re`
gard him as a serious threat. For the nomadic guerrilla tactics in general, see D. NICOLLE, AtH
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Alexios arrayed his forces outside the castle, right in front of the points of the
walls where he had posted the axes with the wheels facing the valley, where the
Pechenegs had encamped. Then he ordered his men to march towards the No`
mads and use skirmishing tactics in order to cause them to attack. If the Pech`
enegs were determined to fight the Byzantines, Alexios instructed his men to
retreat orderly towards the castle, leaving a corridor in the center of their battle
line for the wheels, which at the appropriate time would be left to roll down the
hill. Indeed, the Byzantine plan worked and the axes with the wheels slumped
and gained momentum, ultimately falling upon the Nomads which were climb`
ing the hill on horseback in pursuit of the Byzantines. This caused confusion
and many injuries, especially to the horses of the nomads, forcing them to re`
treat. This stratagem, although it hadn’t any particular effect on the fighting ca`
pacity of the Pechenegs, clearly acted as a morale boost for the Byzantines. On
the following day, the Byzantines faced again the Pechenegs in another battle
and managed to break the blockade and retreat successfully30.
It is very tempting to try to establish a connection between the two strata`
gems of Alexios Comnenos mentioned above and similar military tricks and
ruses of the antiquity and the early Byzantine times. The first stratagem, the
one used against the Normans, shows striking similarities to another one, used
in the battle of Asculum (279 B.C.) by Pyrrhos, the king of Epirus. It has been
preserved in a tenth`century Byzantine compilation of military excerpts, prob`
ably composed under the supervision of the emperor Constantine VII, which
contains excerpts from the Roman Antiquities of Dionysios of Halicarnassus31.
Although Anna characterizes the ruse of her father as a military innovation
(καινόν τι), the description of the aforementioned battle won by Pyrrhos seems
to contradict her in the most impressive way.
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tila and the Nomad Hordes: Warfare on the Eurasian Steppes, 4th`12th Centuries, Osprey Pub`
lishing, Oxford 1990, p. 9`10, 23`25, 46, 52.
30. ANNA COMNENA, p. 23469`23598.
31. This compilation, broadly known as Στρατηγίαι καὶ πολιορκίαι διαφόρων πόλεων (Excerpta
de Strategematis or Excerpta Historica de proeliis et obsidionibus), was edited by C. WESCHER,
Poliorcétique des Grecs, Paris 1867, p. 283`346 (hereafter: WESCHER, Poliorcétique). The text of
Dionysios which belongs to the partly preserved 20th book of the Roman Antiquities occupies
pages 283`292 and has been derived from an Athonic manuscript located in Paris (WESCHER,
Poliorcétique, p. xiii`xviii, 283). Henceforth Loeb’s newer edition (DIONYSIUS OF HALICARNAS`
SUS, Roman Antiquities, trans. E. CARY, v. VII [Loeb Classical Library 388], Cambridge 1950)
shall be used to cite Dionysios’ text (hereafter: DIONYSIUS). Dionysios used as his primary
sources the earlier works of Hieronymos of Cardia, Timaeos of Sicily, Quintus Fabius Pictor and
Lucius Cincius Alimentus, all written in Greek and now permanently lost. Unfortunately it is
impossible to trace the history of the stratagem back to these sources.
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During the second battle fought at 279 B.C. between the Romans and
Pyrrhos at Asculum of Apoulia, located in southern Italy32, the Romans33, look`
ing for a solution against the menace of the elephants of Pyrrhos, which had im`
pressed and troubled them so much during the first battle in Heracleia,
positioned three hundred properly modified wagons in front of their army in
order to neutralize the beasts. The Romans installed devices such as spears
with sharp swordHshaped or sickle`shaped edges (κέστροι µαχαιροειδεῖς ἤ
δρέπανα ὁλοσίδηρα) as well as adapted caltrops and cranes with iron grapples
(καταρράκτας ἐπιρριπτοῦντας ἄνωθεν βαρεῖς κόρακας) upon the wagons.
These devices could be rotated towards all directions. They also built beams
on the edges of which they attached tows suffused with pitch (πίττῃ
λελιπασµένα), which were to be ignited and used against the elephants when
they were close enough. They should cause injuries on their faces and trunks
and thus make them completely uncontrollable; then they would run amok
doing harm to friends and foes alike34. While the battle raged, Pyrrhos decided
to engage his elephants in order to relieve the most hard`pressed section of his
line. Upon seeing this, the Romans manned their wagons (ἐπιβεβηκότες
ἁµάξαις) and moved towards the elephants35. The wagons were able to halt the
impetus of the beasts only for a short time. The men on the elephants threw
javelins from a distance at the crews of the wagons and the light`armed troops
escorting the elephants cut through the wattled screens surrounding the wag`
ons (τά περικείµενα γέρρα ταῖς ἁµάξαις) and began to injure the oxen that
dragged them. As a result, the wagons’ crews were forced to abandon them and
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32. No specific reference will be made to the disputes of the ancient sources on the outcome of the
battle and the confusion between the three majorbattles (Heracleia, Asculum, Beneventum)
Pyrrhos gave against the Romans, because this matter does not relate directly to this study.
The only ancient authors to be dealt with here are Dionysius of Halicarnassus and Dio Cassius.
33. They were led by the consuls Publius Sulpicius Saverrio and Publius Decius Mus.
34. DIONYSIUS, XX.1.6`7: ἐκτὸς δὲ τάξεως τούς τε ψιλοὺς κατέστησαν καὶ τὰς ἁµάξας, τριακοH
σίας τὸν ἀριθµόν, ἃς παρεσκευάσαντο πρὸς τὴν τῶν ἐλεφάντων µάχην. αὗται κεραίας εἶχον
ἐπιβεβηκυίας στώµιξιν ὀρθαῖς πλαγίας, εὐτρόχους, ὅπη βουληθείη τις ἅµα νοήµατι περιάH
γεσθαι δυναµένας ἐπ’ ἄκρων δὲ τῶν κεραιῶν ἢ τριόδοντες ἦσαν ἢ κέστροι µαχαιροειδεῖς ἢ
δρέπανα ὁλοσίδηρα ἢ καταρράκτας τινὰς ἐπιρριπτοῦντας ἄνωθεν βαρεῖς κόρακας. πολH
λαῖς δὲ αὐτῶν χεῖρες προσήρτηντο πυρφόροι στυππεῖα πολλῇ πίττῃ λελιπασµένα περὶ
αὑτὰς ἔχουσαι, προεκκείµεναι τῶν ἁµαξῶν, αἷς ἔµελλον ἑστηκότες ἐπ’ αὐτῶν τινες, ὅτε πληH
σίον γένοιντο τῶν θηρίων, πλήσαντες πυρὸς ἐπὶ τὰς προβοσκίδας αὐτῶν καὶ τὰ πρόσωπα
τὰς πληγὰς φέρειν. ἐφεστήκεσαν δὲ ταῖς ἁµάξαις τετρακύκλοις ὑπαρχούσαις καὶ τῶν ψιλῶν
συχνοί, τοξόται καὶ χερµάται καὶ τριβόλων σιδηρῶν σφενδονῆται, καὶ παρ’ αὐτὰς κάτωH
θεν ἔτι πλείους ἕτεροι.
35. Ibid., XX.2.4.
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to flee towards the lines of the Roman infantry, causing much confusion and
disruption36. The same stratagem has also been mentioned by Dio Cassius, al`
beit in a more synoptic version37.
Some striking similarities can easily be distinguished between the strata`
gem of the Romans against Pyrrhos and the one of Alexios against the Nor`
mans almost 1350 years later. The wagons were used as carriers and/or base
platforms for specialized weapons (beams with rotating spears etc.)38, which
aimed to neutralize the opponent’s super weapon; in the case of Pyrrhos the
war elephants and in the case of the Normans the heavy cavalry39. In both cases,
the wagons were placed in front of the battle lines in order to cut off the mo`
mentum of the enemy assault and were accompanied by lightly armed soldiers
but failed to fulfil their purpose. At Asculum, the lightly armed foot soldiers
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36. Ibid, XX.2.4`5.
37. DIO CASSIUS, Historia Romana, ed. U. P. BOISSEVAIN, v. I (fragments of book 10), Berlin 1895,
p. 134 (hereafter: DIO CASSIUS): οἱ µὲν οὖν Ῥωµαῖοι πρὸς κατάπληξιν τὸν λόγον ἐποίησαν, ὁ
δὲ Πύρρος αὐτοῖς ἐφῆκε διαβῆναι τὸν ποταµόν, µέγα φρονῶν ἐπὶ τοῖς ἐλέφασιν. οἱ δὲ
Ῥωµαῖοι τά τε ἄλλα παρεσκευάσαντο καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἐλέφαντας κεραίας ἐφ’ ἁµαξῶν σεσιH
δηρωµένας καὶ πανταχόθεν προεχούσας ἡτοίµασαν, ἵνα τοξεύοντες ἀπ’ αὐτῶν ἄλλα τε καὶ
πῦρ ἐµποδὼν σφίσι γίνωνται. The text of Dio Cassius is preserved word by word in the much
later work of Ioannis Zonaras, Ἐπιτοµὴ Ἱστοριῶν (IOANNIS ZONARAS, Epitome historiarum, ed.
L. DINDORF, Leipzig 1868–1875), VIII.5.4`8. The text of Dio Cassius is considerably more brief
and short in comparison to that of Dionysios, thus not providing any specific details. One in`
teresting aspect according to Dio Cassius is that Pyrrhos eventually avoided engaging his ele`
phants with the wagons of the Romans; information which is completely opposite to that given
by Dionysios.
38. Although Anna Comnene does not provide specific information and details on how Alexios
had placed the spears on his carriages or on how they were used, it is likely that this was done
in a similar way to that described by Dionysius (rotating beams on which the spears were
adapted). It also seems likely that the spears may have permanently been fixed, with their shafts
pointing in one direction without having any major rotating capability. Dionysios, on his side,
does not provide the exact number of these devices per wagon (perhaps one), unlike Anna, who
states that there were four spears placed on each wagon (ANNA COMNENA, p. 15076`82). Un`
fortunately, in both cases, there is not enough information available. Therefore, any attempt to
reconstruct these devices is based on assumptions.
39. Indeed, the comments made by Anna on the Norman cavalry and its unrivaled and dreadful
charge (see above, n. 17) are reminiscent of the way the Romans viewed the elephants of Pyrrhos.
The elephants as well as the heavy cavalry of the Normans can be regarded as super weapons
of their era, used primarily to break and subsequently to disrupt and dissolve the enemy for`
mation (their functioning is strongly reminiscent of the use of modern tanks and there is no
doubt that for the ancient and medieval warriors, elephants and war horses had represented
something similar, especially when, apart from their impressive appearance and magnitude,
their strong defensive and offensive weaponry are also taken under consideration.
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and the crews of Pyrrhos’ elephants managed to neutralize the wagons of the
Romans. At Ioannina, Bohemond’s horsemen simply bypassed and overcame
the wagons of the Byzantines, without losing their coherence and momentum.
In conclusion, the wagons were used as static points of defense, although it
seemed that they possessed at least some limited autonomy of movement40, but
failed to play an influential role in the development and outcome of the battle
in both cases.
As for the second stratagem, the one used at Tzurulos, the ancient and the
earlier Byzantine literature predating Alexiad contrasts two equally impres`
sive and quite similar military tricks. The first, which also bears the greatest re`
semblance to Alexios’ ruse, is preserved in the sixth book of the history of
Procopios which describes the Gothic War. The second one is preserved in the
work of Arrian Ἀλεξάνδρου ἀνάβασις and in the Στρατηγήµατα of Polyainos,
while descriptions of a similar stratagem have been preserved in one anony`
mous tenth`century military treatise and in the works of Xenophon and Dio
Cassius.
Procopios states, that, in 540 during the course of the Gothic War in Italy,
Velissarius’ forces besieged the city of Auximon41 which was build on a steep
hill, near the Adriatic coast and was the key to the conquest and occupation of
Ravenna42. The Gothic garrison of the town, whose supplies were scarce, at`
tempted everyday sorties to a nearby location, which was full of grass (πόα)
suitable for feeding the horses. The Byzantines were lying in ambush in order
to prevent the Gothic foragers from accomplishing their task and killed several
of them at a time. The perplexed Goths resorted to the following ruse: they re`
moved the wheels and the axles from the carriages located in the town and
lurked awaiting the next Byzantine attack against their foraging parties. In`
deed, the next day the Goths again sent their foragers downhill in order to try
to collect supplies. This triggered the expected reaction from the Byzantines
who rushed to the scene in order to pursue the Goths. When the Byzantines
reached the middle of the distance separating them from the Goths, the Goths
who were in the city let the wheels roll down the slopes. They aimed at striking
the Byzantine phalanx when it was ascending the hill, at the moment when it
was most vulnerable. However, as we are informed by Procopius, the wheels
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40. We know that the wagons of the Romans were towed by oxen (DIONYSIUS, XX.2.5), while those
of Alexios, which must have been more cumbersome, although much lighter, were pushed by foot
soldiers (ANNA COMNENA, p. 15081`82).
41. The modern city of Osimo located in the province of Ancona, 15 km south of the homonymous
city.
42. PROCOPIUS, VI.24.7`10, p. 78.
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rolled down the hill and stopped without doing harm to any Byzantine soldier43.
This Gothic ruse also shows striking similarities to Alexios Comnenos’ strat`
agem. These similarities seem too impressive to be a mere coincidence. But the
stratagem of Alexios Comnenus, which replicates exactly the ineffective strat`
agem mentioned by Procopios which led to the Goths’ failure five centuries ago,
led to a success of the Byzantines. While there were no reported losses for the
Byzantines who were on foot when attacked by the Goths, Alexios’ army suc`
ceeded with his ruse against the Pechenegs who were on horseback44.
Arrian, in a famous excerpt of his, which is also very similar to the incident
recounted by Anna, states that during the campaign of Alexander the Great
against the Triballians and various Thracian tribes in 335 B.C., the Thracians
tried to block Alexander’s advance in one of the passages over Haemus moun`
tain. More specifically, they tried to scatter the dense Macedonian phalanx that
was climbing the narrow passage in tied formation through the use of wagons
which were pushed to descend with momentum against it45. Their effort ulti`
mately failed46 but there are striking similarities between the respective strata`
gem used by Alexios Comnenos 13 centuries later and the incident mentioned
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43. Ibid., VI.23.19`20, p. 68`70: οἱ δὲ βάρβαροι ἀρετῇ τῶν πολεµίων ἡσσώµενοι ἐπενόουν τάδε.
τῶν ἁµαξῶν τοὺς τροχοὺς ξὺν µόνοις τοῖς ἄξοσιν ἀφελόµενοι ἐν παρασκευῇ εἶχον, τέµνειν
τε τὴν πόαν ἀρξάµενοι, ἐπειδὴ ἀνιόντας ἤδη ἐς τοῦ λόφου τὰ µέσα τοὺς Ῥωµαίους εἶδον,
τοὺς τροχοὺς ἀφῆκαν κατὰ κορυφὴν ἐπ‘ αὐτοὺς φέρεσθαι. τύχῃ δέ τινι τούτους ξυνέπεσε
τοὺς τροχοὺς ἄχρι ἐς τὸ ὁµαλὲς ἀνθρώπου οὐδενὸς ἁψαµένους ἐλθεῖν.
44. It should be recalled again that the writer takes the view that the likelihood of the ruse men`
tioned by Anna Comnene lacking a historical basis (that is to be, essentially, a sophisticated lit`
erary imitation of the passage of Procopius) is negligible for reasons to be discussed right below.
45. FLAVIUS ARRIANUS, Anabasis of Alexander, ed. and trans. P. A. BRUNT [Loeb Classical Library
236], London 1976), I.1.6`10 (hereafter: ARRIANUS). These wagons probably belonged to a trade
caravan, as ARRIANUS, I.1.6 states that the mountain was called “the mountain of the traders”
(ὅρος τῶν ἐµπόρων). Arrian is not a primary source for this incident as his work is largely
based on the lost biographies of Alexander by Ptolemy and Aristobulus of Cassandreia: see A.
B. BOSWORTH, Plus ça change…. Ancient Historians and their sources, Classical Antiquity 22
(2003) 167`197 and esp.171`172.
46. ARRIANUS, I.1.10: …ὀλίγα ἔβλαψαν· ἀπέθανε δὲ οὐδεὶς ὑπὸ ταῖς ἁµάξαις. The Macedonians
who could not escape the descending wagons followed the orders of Alexander to lie down on
the ground and hold their shields over them in a specific way. They had to fall to the ground
and link their shields closely together, so that the wagons coming towards them would had to
bound over them because of their gathered impetus and would therefore pass them without
causing them any harm. This seems totally impracticable and unrealistic. Perhaps the incident
was used by Arrian in order to emphasize the high discipline and fighting capabilities of the
Macedonian army. About this stratagem, see E. BLOEDOW, On “wagons” and “shields”: Alexan`
der’s crossing of Mt Haemus in 335 B.C., Ancient History Bulletin 10 (1996) 119`130. The au`
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by Procopios. The main difference is that the Thracians used whole wagons while
the Byzantines only used the wagons’ axons and wheels. Also, in the former case
the ruse resulted in a complete failure, while Alexios Comnenos’ stratagem
achieved a partial success. The same ruse applied by the Thracians is also men`
tioned in the Stratagems of Polyaenos in a considerably summarized form47.
Of relevance to the study of ruses involving wagons is also a passage pre`
served in the work of an anonymous Byzantine editor of the tenth century, en`
titled as Ἀνωνύµου ἤτοι Ἥρωνος Βυζαντίου Πολιορκητικά (Anonymous
Byzantinus or “Heron of Byzantium” Poliorcetica) or Παραγγέλµατα
Πολιορκητικά (also known as De Strategimatibus)48. Within this passage, a va`
riety of objects that can be unleashed from an elevated defensive position (i.e.
a walled city) against the attacking forces that threaten it is presented in de`
tail49. Among other things, the author recommends caution to the besieger in
case the defenders might attempt to launch heavily loaded four`wheeled car`
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thor tries to approach the Thracian ruse in a pragmatic way, which as cited in the ancient text
leaves many gaps, so that many questions concerning the precise manner of implementation as
well as the reactions of Alexander arise. Also, see W. HECKEL, Synaspismos, sarissas and Thra`
cian wagons, Acta Classica 48 (2005) 189`194. On this occasion, the author attempts to spec`
ify the exact type of the soldiers that Alexander arrayed against the Thracians and considers
this as the main reason for the failure of the stratagem.
47. POLYAENUS, Stratagemata, ed. I. MELBER – E. WOELFFLIN, Leipzig 1887, IV.3.11 (hereafter:
POLYAENUS): Ἀλέξανδρος Θρᾳκῶν παρεσκευασµένων καταγόµους ἁµάξας πολλὰς ἐπαφιέναι
τοῖς Μακεδόσι παρήγγειλεν αὐτοῖς ἐκκλίνειν µὲν ὅσας δύναιντο, εἰ δὲ καταλαµβάνοιντο,
καθιέντας αὑτοὺς πρὸς τὴν γῆν ὑπερτιθέναι τὰς ἀσπίδας, ὅπως συµβαίνοι φεροµέναις ταῖς
ἁµάξαις ὑπερπηδᾶν. τοῦτό τοι καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ πείρᾳ γενόµενον ἤλεγξε τοῖς Θρᾳξὶν ἄχρηστον
τὴν τῶν ἁµαξῶν παρασκευήν. Quite significant here is the information that the wagons were
overburdened (κατάγοµοι), an information which is not provided by the text of Arrian. For an
English translation, see P. KRENTZ – E. L. WHEELER, Polyaenus: Stratagems of War, v. I,
Chicago 1994, p. 338.
48. WESCHER, Poliorcétique, p.197 uses the title Ἀνωνύµου ἤτοι Ἥρωνος Βυζαντίου
Πολιορκητικά, while R. Schneider prefers the title Παραγγέλµατα Πολιορκητικά: R. SCHNEI`
DER, Griechische Poliorketiker, mit den handschriftlichen Bildern, herausgegeben und über`
setzt, v. II, Berlin 1908, p. 4 (hereafter: SCHNEIDER, Poliorketiker). This treatise, as its title
indicates, is attributed to a certain Heron, although it is unknown whether it refers to Heron
of Alexandria, or someone namesake who lived eight centuries later (known as “Heron of
Byzantium”).
49. WESCHER, Poliorcétique, p. 20420`2052. The text of “Heron” is contained on pages 197`279;
SCHNEIDER, Poliorketiker, p. 12`14. Schneider uses Wescher’s page numbering (20420`2052). The
text of Παραγγέλµατα is contained on pages 4`109. For the most recent edition of this work,
see D. SULLIVAN, Siegecraft. Two Tenth`Century Instructional Manuals by “Heron of Byzan`
tium” [Dumbarton Oaks Studies], Washington, D.C. 2000 (hereafter: SULLIVAN, Siegecraft), p.
26`113 (Παραγγέλµατα Πολιορκητικὰ) and p. 153`248 (commentary).
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riages against the attackers, as mentioned in the narratives of Arrian and
Polyaenos50. It seems that there is an obvious connection between these texts.
Actually, the Παραγγέλµατα is an expanded paraphrase of an even earlier
work written c. 100 AD, the Πολιορκητικά of Apollodoros from Damascus51.
Perhaps Apollodoros issues his warning having the event of the Thracians
against Alexander at the mountain Haemus in mind. The description of Apol`
lodoros matches sufficiently with that of Polyaenos; both make reference to
heavily loaded wagons (καταγόµους και φορτίοις βεβαρηµέναι), in contrast
to Arrian. This seems to indicate that Polyaenos apart from the text of Arrian
also used the text of Apollodoros as a source for his work.
This particular stratagem seems to be quite old, as it can be traced back in
Xenophon’s work52, and it must have been often applied and therefore well
known, as it has also been mentioned by Dio Cassius in his Roman History53.
Its frequent mention in Ancient sources and its citation in Byzantine sources
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50. SULLIVAN, Siegecraft, p. 36, 52`5: δεῖ τὰ ἄνωθεν ἀπὸ τῶν ἐναντίων ἐπικυλιόµενα παραφυλάτH
τεσθαι βάρη, ἅτινά εἰσι λίθοι στρογγύλοι, κίονες, τροχοί, σφόνδυλοι, ἅµαξαι τετράτροχοι
φορτίοις βεβαρηµέναι, ἀγγεῖα.
51. WESCHER, Poliorcétique, p. 139.10`11. The text of Apollodoros is contained on pages 137`193.
Also, see R. SCHNEIDER, Poliorketiker, I: Apollodoros, Berlin 1908, p. 10. The text of Apol`
lodoros is contained on pages 1`65 and Schneider keeps also here Wescher’s page numbering.
The only major difference from the corresponding above`mentioned passage of “Heron” is the
addition of the characterization ‘four`wheeled’ to the wagons’ description. Specifically for Apol`
lodoros’ treatise, see H. BLYTH, Apollodorus of Damascus and the Poliorcetica, Greek, Roman
and Byzantine Studies 33 (1992) 127`158 and D. WHITEHEAD, Apollodorus’ Poliorketika: Au`
thor, Date, Dedicatee, in: A Roman Miscellany. Essays in Honour of Anthony R. Birley on his
Seventieth Birthday, H. M. SCHELLENBERG – V. E. HIRSCHMANN – A. KRIECKHAUS (eds.), Gdansk
2008, p. 204`212.
52. XENOPHON, Cyrus’s Anabasis, trans. C. L. BROWNSON [Loeb Classical Library 3], Cambridge
1922, IV.2.3: ἐπεὶ δὲ ἦσαν ἐπὶ χαράδρᾳ οἱ ὀπισθοφύλακες ἣν ἔδει διαβάντας πρὸς τὸ ὄρθιον
ἐκβαίνειν, τηνικαῦτα ἐκύλινδον οἱ βάρβαροι ὁλοιτρόχους ἁµαξιαίους καὶ µείζους καὶ ἐλάτH
τους, οἳ φερόµενοι πρὸς τὰς πέτρας παίοντες διεσφενδονῶντο· καὶ παντάπασιν οὐδὲ πεH
λάσαι οἷόν τ’ ἦν τῇ εἰσόδῳ. This incident refers to one of the clashes of the Ten Thousand with
several Carduchian tribes during their long return march from Mesopotamia in 401 B.C.
53. DIO CASSIUS, LVI.14.1`3, describes a minor engagement between the forces of Tiberius and the
rebels of Dalmatia during the great rebellion of Pannonia in AD 6`9. The rebels, which had oc`
cupied an elevated fortified position, used wheels and wagons loaded with rocks against the on`
coming roman soldiers: ἰδόντες δὲ τοῦτο οἱ ∆ελµάται ἔξω τε τοῦ τείχους ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ τοῦ
κρηµνώδους παρετάξαντο, καὶ λίθους πολλοὺς τοὺς µὲν σφενδόναις ἐπ’ αὐτοὺς ἔβαλλον
τοὺς δὲ καὶ κατεκυλίνδουν. ἄλλοι τροχούς ἄλλοι ἁµάξας ὅλας πλήρεις πετρῶν, ἄλλοι κιH
βωτοὺς περιφερεῖς, ἐπιχωρίως πως πεποιηµένας καὶ λίθων γεµούσας, ἠφίεσαν. καὶ ταῦτά τε
πάντα ἅµα πολλῇ ῥύµῃ καταφερόµενα διεσφενδονᾶτο, καὶ τοὺς Ῥωµαίους διέσπα τε ἔτι
καὶ µᾶλλον ἀπ’ ἀλλήλων καὶ συνήλου.
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suggest that it was really applied in practice and that it wasn’t simply a sort of
literary exaggeration aiming at an enrichment of a Byzantine historian’s nar`
rative. It is noteworthy that in almost all of its references, the stratagem invol`
ving wagons and heavy loads was used by “barbarians” against “civilized”
people, Greeks, Romans and Byzantines alike, except the case of its use by
Alexius. Alexius was obviously the first to use this stratagem originally con`
ceived by “barbarians” against people of the same flock. Provided that Alexios’
two stratagems were factual and not just fanciful stories of his daughter and bi`
ographer, Anna, the military brain which conceived and executed them must
have had knowledge, direct or indirect, of the passages of Procopius as well as
the Byzantine compendiums of Polyaenos54 and the Byzantine version of Apol`
lodoros’ treatise on siegecraft. It seems that either Anna Comnene or her father
or both of them had at least read some of those sources55. Regarding the ques`
tion of the authenticity of the facts described by Anna Comnene, there are de`
tails that advocate in favor of their veracity56.
Concerning the first incident at Ioannina, the testimony of William of Apu`
lia combined with some details from the description of Anna Comnene, such
as the type of wagons, the number of arms placed on each and, last but not
least, the obvious acceptance of the failure of her father’s stratagem, argue in
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54. The text of Polyaenos has been cited several times by later Byzantine authors. The incident with
the Thracian wagons at the mountain Haemos has also been described in three Byzantine adap`
tations of Polyaenos which have been dated back to the late tenth and early eleventh century,
are directly related to the prototype and might have been known to Alexios Comnenus, at least
to some extent. The stratagem can be found on all three of them, viz. the Ὑποθέσεις ἐκ τῶν
στρατηγικῶν πράξεων, 49.2 (Excerpta Polyaeni, in POLYAENUS, p. 489), the Στρατηγήµατα
παλαιῶν ἀνδρῶν, 47.2 (in J. A. DE FOUCAULT, Strategemata, Paris 1949, p. 17`66) and the ΠαH
ρεκβολαὶ ἐκ τῶν στρατηγικῶν πράξεων, 36 (ibid., p. 75`120). Ὑποθέσεις, the earlier of the
three, dated to the tenth century, were used as a model upon which the Στρατηγήµατα (late
tenth century or early eleventh) and the Παρεκβολαὶ (first quarter of eleventh century) were
based. For an extensive analysis of the origin and citation and alteration process of these se`
lected Byzantine excerpts which have been derived from the original text of Polyaenos and con`
stitute a short compendium of some of the stratagems he described, see: A. DAIN, Les cinq
adaptations byzantines des “Stratagèmes” de Polyen, Revue des Études Anciennes 33 (1931)
321`346; IDEM, Les stratégistes byzantins, Travaux et mémoires 2 (1967) 364`365, 368`369; F.
SCHINDLER, Die Überlieferung der Strategemata des Polyainos, Wien 1973, p. 205`225.
55. There is evidence in the Alexiad that Anna Comnene had direct knowledge of the Taktika (see
ANNA COMNENA, p. 39549`58, in comparison with LEO, Taktika, XX.51, (p. 554) 119 (p. 576`
578) and 136 (p. 582).
56. The author expresses his opinion concerning the authenticity of the two ancient stratagems
based on the relevant articles also mentioned in n. 46 but does not try to take an absolute de`
cision concerning their truthfulness.
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favor of authenticity. Regarding the second incident at Tzurulos, the strong bias
and admiration which Anna shows towards her father might lead to the pre`
mature conclusion that the incident could have been made up by her and would
therefore belong to the realm of myth. However, some details of her description
could lead to a contradictory assessment57. Anna describes the injuries suffered
by the horses of the Pechenegs from the impetuous impact of the wagon wheels
in detail. More specifically, she states that the wheels were reaping either the
front or the rear pair of the horses’ legs like scythes during the riders’ attempt
to jump over the wheels in order to avoid them58. Such injuries forced the ani`
mals to sit towards the part of their body that had received the blow, thereby
causing the rider to fall. According to the author’s opinion, this extremely vivid
realistic description would only be possible by a person who participated in the
battle and shared his experiences with Anna Comnene afterwards. Anna her`
self, who was only about seven years old when this conflict took place, admits
that she incorporated in her work information drawn from eyewitnesses, old sol`
diers and comrades of her father, especially concerning the battles and cam`
paigns she describes59. Therefore, there are many chances that the incident
narrated by Anna Comnena and attributed to the ingenuity and military ex`
pertise of her father and his knowledge of the antiquity might have been real.
However, if we accept the pragmatic hypostasis of the two events described
by Anna Comnene and do not consider them as figments of her own imagina`
tion, the following question arises: can the conception and execution of these
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57. Initially, the author himself was concerned regarding the attribution of this particular strata`
gem to Alexios and his undeniable military capabilities and virtues. He also considered the
possibility that it could have been an outcome of the imagination of his highly educated daugh`
ter and biographer. Her great knowledge of the works of ancient authors enhances the likelihood
that she could have been inspired and even been inclined to imitate and even copy some pas`
sages of ancient works that had a great impression on her (see above, n. 28). However, the fact
that Anna’s details have been apparently derived from tales told by eyewitnesses and differ from
those of the ancient prototypes leads to the conclusion that her descriptions are based on true
events.
58. ANNA COMNENA, p. 23353`23464: ...οἱ δὲ τροχοὶ µετά τινος ῥοίζου καὶ καταφορᾶς ἐνεχθέντες
ὑπὲρ πῆχυν ἀπὸ τοῦ τείχους ἕκαστος ἐφαλλόµενοι ἅτε τῶν κυρτοτήτων ἑκάστου τροχοῦ
ἀποκρουσθεισῶν ἐκ τοῦ τείχους καὶ οἷον ἀποσφενδονηθεισῶν εἰς µέσους τοὺς τῶν
βαρβάρων ἱππότας ἐξεκυλίσθησαν ῥύµην λαβόντες σφοδροτέραν. Τὸ µὲν καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς
ἀθρόας καταφορᾶς τῷ φυσικῷ πειθόµενοι βάρει, τὸ δὲ καὶ ῥοπὴν λαβόντες ἀκάθεκτον ἀπὸ
τοῦ κατάντους τοῦ τόπου σφοδρῶς τε τοῖς βαρβάροις ἐνέπιπτον καὶ πανταχόθεν αὐτοὺς πεH
ριέθλιβον τὰ σκέλη τῶν ἵππων ὥσπερ θερίζοντες καὶ ἀµφότερα ἑκατέρωθεν ἀπό τε τῶν
ἐµπροσθίων καὶ ὀπισθίων µερῶν διατεµόµενοι ὀκλάσαι τοὺς ἵππους, ἐφ‘ ἃ µέρη τὴν πληγὴν
ἐδέξαντο, κατηνάγκασαν καὶ τοὺς ἱππότας συγκαταβαλεῖν.
59. Ibid., p. 742`46 and 45119`45380.
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stratagems be attributed to Alexius Comnenos or were they perhaps inspired
by one of his seasoned officers?
Undoubtedly, Alexios Comnenos had the ability, the military audacity, the
bravery and the courage to carry out such operations. During his early military
career before the resumption of the imperial power but also during the subse`
quent period as an emperor, he carried out several bold actions which sometimes
were crowned with success and sometimes with failure. Alexios also used a num`
ber of military tricks and ruses, since he was a foremost exponent of the concept
“win by any means and by any manner” either by fighting in the open field or
by using trickery and cunning, as clearly shown by his actions60. Not only Anna
Comnene but also her husband Nicephoros Bryennios confirms the tendency of
his father in law to resort to all kinds of tricks and ruses in order to prevail over
his vastly diverse, from a military viewpoint, opponents, in his work61. The mil`
itary and diplomatic skills of Alexios, though overemphasised by Anna Comnene
and her husband, the caesar, which also belonged to the immediate family of the
emperor, are rather indisputable for most modern scholars62.
What is perhaps not widely known is the fact that in most battles Alexios
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60. The use of stratagems and subterfuge in order to wear a stronger opponent down and postpone
the battle until the circumstances become more favorable is one of the most characteristic fea`
tures of Byzantine military tradition, see: E. MCGEER, Sowing the dragon’s teeth. Byzantine
warfare in the tenth century [Dumbarton Oaks Studies], Washington, D.C. 1995, p. 255. From
the early Byzantine period on, the vast majority of military treatises advised and encouraged
troop commanders to undertake this way of action. See: MAURIKIOS, IV.1`5, VII.Α, VII.B.3`4, 14`
15 and especially VIII.1`2; LEO, Taktika, XII.4, XII.106, XIV.40`42, 46, XVII.4, XX.11`12, 51,
106, 136; Περὶ Στρατηγίας, ed. G. T. DENNIS, Three Byzantine military treatises [Corpus
Fontium Historiae Byzantinae 25], Washington, D.C. 1985, p. 2212 and 10053 (Περὶ ΣτρατηH
γίας). In Dennis’ edition, the treatise Περὶ Στρατηγίας is still referred to as the Anonymous
Byzantine treatise on strategy. On the attribution of this work to Syrianos Magistros, see C.
ZUCKERMAN, The Compendium of Syrianus Magister, Jahrbuch der Österreichischen ByzantiH
nistik 40 (1990) 209`224. It cannot be considered a mere coincidence that most of the ancient
military works preserved in Byzantine adaptations include ruses and stratagems, which ap`
parently attracted the interest of the Byzantine writers.
61. The use of subterfuge and ploys in the war against the rebel Roussel de Bailleul in 1074 and
against the Turks who had overwhelmed Asia Minor has been described by Bryennios. See
NICEPHOROS BRYENNIOS, Historiarum libri quattuor, ed. P. GAUTIER [Corpus Fontium Historiae
Byzantinae 9], Bruxelles 1975 (hereafter: BRYENNIOS), p. 185`189 and 205`207, respectively.
62. The opinions of modern military historians on the military capabilities of Alexios differ. For
example, BIRKENMEIER, Development, p. 81`84, does not regard him as something extraordinary
although he acknowledges his abilities but others, like HALDON, Byzantine Wars, p.135, recog`
nize his skills and tactics on the battlefield, while W. TREADGOLD, A History of the Byzantine
State and Society, Stanford 1997, p. 611, considers him to be a military genius.
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has given, whether initially as a grand domestikos or later as an emperor, he had
highly experienced and talented senior officers, most of which belonged to his
close family environment via a clever system of intermarriages, under his com`
mand63. Specific mention should be made to two of them, Georgios Paleologos64,
the emperor’s brother in law and Gregorios Mavrokatakalon65. Paleologos has
been repeatedly characterized as an officer who thought and acted bravely, ac`
complished great deeds and was highly experienced in military affairs66. He
and Mavrokatakalon also seemed to have had particular expertise in tackling
with the people of the steppe67. Georgios Paleologos and some other highly ex`
perienced veteran officers (τινες τῶν περὶ τὰ πολεµικὰ πεῖραν ἐκ µακροῦ
χρόνου ἐσχηκότων ἐπιµελῶς) advised the young emperor to avoid a battle in
open field with the Normans68. But as the young emperor did not follow their
advice, he was subsequently defeated in the battle of Dyrrachium in October
108169.
Alexios benefited and learned a lot from the experience of these veterans
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63. In this group of senior officers can be selectively included: Alexandros Kavasilas (ANNA COM`
NENA, p. 12615), Tatikios, the grand primikirios of Turkish origin (ibid., p. 12615`12720), Pak`
ourianos, the grand domestikos of Georgian origin (ibid., p. 6357`58), Oumbertopoulos the Frank
(ibid, p. 24764`65 and 25295), the caesar Nicephorus Melissenos (ibid., p. 28643`44), Georgios Pale`
ologos, who has repeatedly been mentioned in most of the battles fought by Alexios by Anna
Comnene and Bryennios, Gregorios and Nicolaos Mavrokatakalon (ibid., p. 21012 and 29432`33
respectively) and others.
64. B. SKOULATOS, Les personnages byzantins de l’Alexiade. Analyse prosopographique et synthèse,
Louvain 1980 (hereafter: SKOULATOS, Personnages), p. 99`105; J.`C. CHEYNET – J. F. VANNIER,
Études Prosopographiques, Paris 1986, p. 137`141.
65. For Gregorios Mavrokatakalon, see SKOULATOS, Personnages, p. 111`112.
66. BRYENNIOS, p. 3056: Περὶ τὰ στρατιωτικὰ πολλὴν ἐµπειρίαν κεκτηµένος; ibid., p. 3071`2: ταγH
µατάρχης ὤν εµπειρότατος καὶ κατὰ χεῖρα καὶ γνώµην γενναῖος (description of the battle
against the mercenary Turkish troops of the rebel Nicephorus Melissenos in 1081).
67. ANNA COMNENA, p. 21011`18. Anna Comnene describes the advice adressed to Alexios not to ven`
ture a cavalry attack against the fortified wagons of the Pechenegs. As Gregorios
Mavrokatakalon had been captured and held as a prisoner by the Pechenegs, he was aware of
their war practices. The former rebel Nicephoros Bryennios, who was acting as an advisor of
the Emperor after his blindness, must also have gained experience in the Petchenegs’ war prac`
tises (ibid., p. 20560`64). Georgios Palaeologos was distinguished in the wars against the Nor`
mans, especially during the siege of Dyrrachium (ibid., p. 120`130).
68. Ibid., p. 1291`13017.
69. Likewise, Alexios relied on the advice of many of the relatives and colleagues listed above (see
above, n. 63) just before facing the threat of Cumans who invaded Thrace in 1084 (ANNA COM`
NENA, p. 28642`50). Prior to the decisive battle, Anna Comnene states that he asked their advice
on whether to fight or to avoid a direct confrontation with the army of Cumans that outnum`
bered them.
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who accompanied him on his campaigns. It is almost certain that he closely
cooperated with some of them and consulted them when he applied these two
“special” stratagems. The idea of this unusual use of wagons against the Nor`
mans and the Pechenegs might not exclusively belong to him but this matter is
of little importance70. Regardless of who had the idea to implement the two
stratagems, one can draw useful conclusions about the theoretical education of
the Byzantine military aristocracy, since the vast majority of senior officials
who served in the Byzantine army at the time of the Comnenoi were members
of large aristocratic families, most of which were interconnected through in`
termarriages with the imperial family. We can draw information about the the`
oretical military education of a senior military official and even a
soldier`emperor like Alexios Comnenos from these stratagems. We can try to
trace back and discern the origin and the number of written sources which
formed this kind of military education. It seems that this type of training, the
conduct of which we mostly ignore as there is insufficient information71 and as
military schools were non`existent at those times, was based on a fairly large
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70. Either way, the glory achieved through the success of such an action belonged to the emperor
himself and not to one of his servants, whether the conception of the idea was his or not. How`
ever, it is equally possible that the conception of these two military tricks could have been an
exclusive product of the military knowledge of Alexios, a revival of the military past adjusted
to the Byzantine military needs and practices ` also according to the author’s point of view. It
is obvious that the person who inspired these tricks had great knowledge of the ancient theo`
rists of war, of the tactical manuals and the ancient writers in general in addition to practical
military experience.
71. Very little information has been preserved on the existence of specialized teachers in charge of
military education and practical military training who mainly taught the offspring of aristo`
cratic families, which were the only ones able to financially withstand such a demanding train`
ing, during this period. The most significant information is provided by Nicephoros Bryennios,
who, when referring to the military training of John and Isaac Comnenos, the father and the
uncle of Alexios I Comnenos respectively, uses the archaic terms παιδαγωγὸς (pedagogue) and
παιδοτρίβης (superintendent). See BRYENNIOS, p. 7515`22: παιδαγωγοὺς γὰρ αὐτοῖς ἐπιστήσας
καὶ παιδοτρίβας (…) τὰ πολεµικὰ ἐκδιδάσκειν (…) τὰ τακτικὰ µελετᾶν (…) ὅσα δὴ τὰ ταH
κτικὰ ἐκδιδάσκουσι. Michael Psellos, in his Chronography, while expressing his antipathy to`
wards the emperor Romanos IV (1067`1071), boasts that he was far more superior than him,
not only in classical culture and spirit, but also in the area which the “soldier`emperor” con`
sidered his own specialty per excellence: the science of Taktika (MICHAEL PSELLOS, Imperatori
di Bizanzio, Cronografia, ed. S. IMPELLIZZERI, Vicenza 1984, VII.b 16: ὡς δέ µε οἶδε τὴν ταH
κτικὴν ἐπιστήµην ἠκριβωκότα...καὶ τἄλλα ὅσα στρατηγικῶν εἰσι διατάξεων…) (hereafter:
PSELLOS). Some further evidence about the military training of the military aristocracy of the
fourteenth and fifteenth centuries is given by M. BARTUSIS, The Late Byzantine Army. Arms and
Society, 1204`1453, Philadelphia 1992, p. 207.
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number of works related to military issues, original or more often adapted72.
Concerning the stratagems analysed in this article, the passages from Proco`
pios, Arrian, Polyaenos and Dionysios of Halicarnassus must have been used
for military education purposes.
The theoretical military education seemed to be very important and wide`
spread in the circles of the Byzantine aristocracy of the Comnenian emperors’
period73. The number of sources used and processed by the Byzantines, which
originated from the entire spectrum of the ancient Greek (primarily) and Latin
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72. Apart from the widespread military manuals and military treatises of the Byzantine period
(sixth ` tenth centuries) which relied heavily on respective manuals and treatises of the antiq`
uity and in many cases copied them by word, there were several historical ancient texts that in`
cluded extensive references to military conflicts, wars and stratagems, which could be used as
guides for the military training of Byzantine civil and military officials, as they had been gath`
ered in relevant collections, such as the aforementioned Excerpta de strategematis. Examples in`
clude the works of some ancient theorists of military art (fourth century B.C. ` fourth century
A.D.) the works of which were preserved and used during the Byzantine era, whether as pro`
totypes or, more frequently, as later adaptations. Those were the results of the popular custom
of Byzantine writers and scholars to compile anthologies with extracts from different authors,
based on common themes, such as: the Στρατηγήµατα of Polyaenos, the Θεωρία Τακτικὴ of
Aeneus Tacticus, the τέχνη Τακτική of Asclepiodotos (based on the lost work of Posidonius),
the treatise of Aelianus Tacticus Περὶ στρατηγικῶν τάξεων Ἑλληνικῶν (“On Tactical Arrays
of the Greeks”), as well as Arrian’s “Array against the Alans” (κατὰ Ἁλανῶν ἔκταξις), the
Epitoma rei militaris of Vegetius and the Strategemata of Frontinus, the last two in Latin. Mil`
itary treatises were written by other authors, whose works are not preserved (e.g. Polybios). The
emperor Constantine VII, in tenth century, considered that every emperor who departed on
campaign should necessarily have the manuals of Polyaenos and Syrianus Magister with him
(CONSTANTINE PORPHYROGENITUS, De Cerimoniis aulae Byzantinae, ed. J. REISKE, Bonnae1860,
I.4677ff: βιβλία στρατηγικὰ, βιβλία µηχανικὰ, ἑλεπόλεις ἔχοντα, καὶ βελοποιoκὰ καὶ ἕτερα
ἁρµόδια τῇ ὑποθέσει, ἤγουν πρὸς πολέµους καὶ καστροµαχίας· βιβλία ἱστορικὰ, ἐξαιρέτως
δὲ τὸν Πολύαινον καὶ τὸν Συριανόν). For the use of ancient Taktika in Byzantium, see also W.
E. KAEGI, Some Thoughts on Byzantine Military Strategy, Brookline 1983, p. 1`18 (especially p.
10`13). For the Byzantine military compilations, which sometimes replicate verbatim the an`
cient works, particularly Polyaenos, mention has already been made above (see above, n. 54).
73. Psellos in his encomium addressed to the caesar John Doukas, uncle of Michael VII (1071`
1078), refers to his ability in military science, stressing that this did not originate automatically
or accidentally, but by studying the military tactica, the treatises on strategy and siegecraft
and especially the works of Aelios and Apollodoros (PSELLOS, VIII.16: τῶν τακτικῶν βιβλίων
καὶ στρατηγικῶν καὶ πολιορκητικῶν καὶ περὶ ὅσων οἱ περὶ Αἴλιον καὶ Ἀπολλόδωρον συγH
γεγράφασιν. Here probably refers to Aelianus Tacticus and not the orator Aelius Aristeides).
With the phrase οἱ περὶ Αἴλιον καὶ Ἀπολλόδωρον συγγεγράφασιν Psellos probably refers to
the later Byzantine compilations of these works and not the originals. This testimony of Psel`
los for Apollodoros reinforces the likelihood (see above p.13) sections of the work of the latter
to have been known (perhaps through the Παραγγέλµατα) to Alexios Comnenos and his mil`
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(less) literature, is particularly impressive. The analysis of the two stratagems
of Alexios Comnenos reveals that the Byzantines studied meticulously and ap`
plied the ancient sources in practice and that they also gave particular impor`
tance to learning and assimilating the military theory, both of ancient and
medieval writers, which as a result they maintained at the highest possible level.
These stratagems demonstrate that Alexios and the members of the military
aristocracy of the period74 must have had excellent knowledge of the works of
the ancient historians and tacticians or at least of several ancient passages of
military interest as well as of the Byzantine strategic manuals which were also
based to a high extent on ancient strategic military treatises and excerpts75.
However, one question remains unanswered. Why do these stratagems,
which occur with some slight discrepancies in several ancient sources, not ap`
pear in other Byzantine sources? Was Alexius the only one who knew about the
sources referring to them? Probably not. Already from the sixth century, the
Byzantines had highly developed military literature. The two main reasons why
similar tricks are not mentioned by the sources are the limited interest in minor
matters of military nature, such as ruses or stratagems, shown in the majority
of the sources following Procopios up until the advent of historians and chron`
iclers of the eleventh century and the extreme rarity of the special military and
geographic conditions which were required in order to apply such stratagems.
We should not forget that such a use of wagons on the battlefield was a last
ditch effort and a product of contingency for Alexios. Therefore it is reasonable
and normally expected not to have frequent references to relevant stratagems
in the sources which record the campaigns of earlier or later Byzantine em`
perors and military commanders. The application of these stratagems indicates
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itary staff. Besides that, Psellos chronologically is very close to Alexios Comnenos. Another
passage from the Alexiad confirms that Alexios had good knowledge of the work of Aelianus
Tacticus (ANNA COMNENA, p. 46982`83: ἦν γὰρ οὐδὲ τῆς Αἰλιανοῦ Τακτικῆς ἀδαής).
74. Indeed, these works are addressed exclusively to members of the imperial family or generals of
aristocratic lineage (throughout the Komnenian period most generals were members of an es`
tablished aristocratic elite). It seems quite probable that one major function of these manuals
was to be a part of a conversation and exchange of opinions between the members of the im`
perial court about the military achievements of the ancients and the way these could be in`
serted in the realities of Byzantine era warfare. See D. SULLIVAN, Byzantine military manuals,
Prescriptions, practice and pedagogy, in: The Byzantine world, P. STEPHENSON (ed.), London
2010, p. 149, 155, 160 (hereafter: SULLIVAN, Military manuals).
75. Contrary to the stratagems of Alexios, the one mentioned by Procopios (see above, p. 10`11),
of which himself was an eyewitness, obviously does not derives from a study of ancient mili`
tary stratagems (after all, it was applied by the Goths); however it became an example for the
subsequent military men.
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the high extent of adjustment displayed by the Byzantines against all kinds of
military innovation, which were willing to adopt, regardless of its origin. Alex`
ios, at least as portrayed through the written sources during the mature phase
of his reign, although as a young general did not avoid errors due to his im`
pulsivity, is a perfect example of the emperor`general, which applies ruses and
uses conventional as well as unconventional warfare methods in order to
emerge victorious, acting in this way in accordance with the directions given
by Byzantine military manuals76.
The Byzantine military commanders were inspired by the achievements of
the Ancient strategists and they were trying to imitate their exploits while
preparing to march for war. Their military manuals were more than a simple
collection of written memories and events; they preserved military actions of
ancient times in a way that enabled the teaching of military lessons. The Byzan`
tines did not hesitate to adopt military tricks, tested in practice by both friends
and foes. The high degree of dependence of the Byzantines on military manu`
als and treatises was already known; what is most impressive is their heavy re`
liance on these manuals. For every likely and unlikely military incident, during
a battle or a campaign, the Byzantines were well equipped with written in`
structions from which they apparently rarely diverted77.
Although the Byzantine Empire never formally acquired a military school
for its officials, mutatis mutandis there was nearly nothing to envy from the
corresponding theoretical military training of modern states78. The stratagems
and the ability to use any means, whether conventional or unorthodox, to
achieve the objective aims, indicate a very advanced military philosophy, a pro`
duct of many centuries of Greek and Roman military thinking. The high ranked
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76. LEO, Taktika, epilogue 35, p. 628: <∆εῖ δέ σε> ὀξέως ποιητικόν τε εἶναι στρατηγηµάτων καὶ
ἀγχίνουν ἐν ταῖς ἐπιχειρήσεσιν ὑπάρχειν, καὶ ὅταν αὐτὸς ἐπιτίθεσθαι βούλει τοῖς πολεµίH
οις καὶ ὅταν ἐπιβουλεύεσθαι µέλλῃς παρὰ τῶν πολεµίων.
77. Therefore, questions about whether Byzantine officers were allowed to improvise and to what
extent arise. Although improvisation constitutes an essential element for the success of any mil`
itary officer or leader at any time, it is the opinion of the author that improvisation was ex`
tremely limited among the Byzantines and that in the cases when it was permissible, it was
exclusively applied by military officials. We should keep in mind that very often, especially dur`
ing the period before the Comnenian emperors, high ranked political officials who usually be`
longed to the close imperial environment and had little or no military experience undertook the
leadership of Byzantine armies because of their assumed fidelity. The detailed pedantry demon`
strated by the Byzantine military manuals can partly be explained by the fact that the manu`
als took this category of officials into consideration and were addressed especially to them.
78. Such a military school came much later, with the advent of the national states. See SULLIVAN,
Military manuals, p. 149.
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Byzantine military officials of that period (eleventh ` twelfth centuries) had an
excellent bibliography of military strategies and ruses at their disposal, which
they used to carry out their military enterprises with advantageous conditions
for themselves. As very eloquently observed by G. T. Dennis79, when the Byzan`
tines conducted their wars and battles by following the instructions of the mil`
itary manuals, they had a good chance to defeat their opponents.
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79. G. T. DENNIS, The Byzantines in Battle, in: Το Εµπόλεµο Βυζάντιο (9οςH12ος αι.), N. OIKONO`
MIDES (ed.), National Hellenic Research Foundation/Institute for Byzantine Studies, Athens
1997, p. 165`178, here p. 178.
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ΠΕΡΙΛΗΨΗ
Η ΧΡΗΣΗ ΑΡΧΑΙΩΝ ΕΓΧΕΙΡΙ∆ΙΩΝ ΣΤΡΑΤΗΓΙΚΗΣ
ΣΕ ΜΕΣΑΙΩΝΙΚΕΣ ΜΑΧΕΣ:
∆ΥΟ ΤΕΧΝΑΣΜΑΤΑ ΤΟΥ ΑΛΕΞΙΟΥ ΚΟΜΝΗΝΟΥ
ΕΝΑΝΤΙΟΝ ΝΟΡΜΑΝ∆ΩΝ ΚΑΙ ΠΕΤΣΕΝΕΓΚΩΝ
Ο Αλέξιος Κοµνηνός χρησιµοποίησε σε δύο συγκεκριµένα τεχνάσµατά
του άµαξες, καθώς και τµήµατα αµαξών, όπως τροχούς και άξονες, µε
αρκετά περίεργους και πρωτότυπους τρόπους, προκειµένου να επιτύχει
τακτικό πλεονέκτηµα στο πεδίο της µάχης. Στην πρώτη περίπτωση, σε µία
ελάσσονα µάχη η οποία διεξήχθη το 1082 έξω από τα τείχη των —
κατεχοµένων από τους Νορµανδούς του Βοηµούνδου — Ιωαννίνων,
χρησιµοποίησε µε µικρή επιτυχία άµαξες ως στατικά µέσα ανάσχεσης του
επίφοβου βαρέος νορµανδικού ιππικού. Στη δεύτερη περίπτωση, κατά τη
σύντοµη πολιορκία του κάστρου της Τζουρουλού από τους Πετσενέγκους,
το 1090, χρησιµοποίησε µε µεγαλύτερη επιτυχία τµήµατα τροχών από άµαξες
κατά τέτοιο τρόπο ώστε να επιφέρει σύγχυση και αναταραχή στις τάξεις
των πολυάριθµων νοµάδων.
Η Άννα Κοµνηνή επαινεί τα τεχνάσµατα του πατέρα της και τα
χαρακτηρίζει πρωτότυπα προόντα της στρατηγικής διανοίας του Αλεξίου.
Μία προσεκτικότερη, ωστόσο, έρευνα αρχαίων στρατηγικών πραγµατειών
φαίνεται να τη διαψεύδει µε τον πλέον εντυπωσιακό τρόπο. Τα τεχνάσµατα
αυτά απαντούν σε πολύ αρχαιότερους συγγραφείς, όπως ο Ξενοφών, ο
Πολύαινος, ο Αρριανός, ο Απολλόδωρος, αλλά και ο Προκόπιος, και
µάλιστα µε εντυπωσιακές οµοιότητες. Προκύπτουν, συνεπώς, τα εξής δύο
συµπεράσµατα· είτε, πρώτον, η ίδια η Άννα Κοµνηνή γνώριζε τα
συγκεκριµένα χωρία των αρχαίων συγγραφέων και τα ενέταξε ηθεληµένα,
ελαφρώς παραλλαγµένα, στη διήγησή της, προκειµένου να εξυµνήσει τα
κατορθώµατα του πατέρα της, µε συνέπεια η αυθεντικότητα τους να είναι
αµφισβητήσιµη, είτε, δεύτερον, ο Αλέξιος Κοµνηνός πραγµατικά εφάρµοσε
τα τεχνάσµατα αυτά και συνεπώς είχε ο ίδιος ή οι κοντινοί του σύµβουλοι
γνώση των αρχαίων αυτών κειµένων.
Η πρόσβαση σε αυτά τα έργα επιτυγχανόταν, πιθανότατα, µέσα από τις
πάµπολλες επιτοµές και ανθολογίες τους οι οποίες χρονολογούνται από την
THEOCHARIS ALEXOPOULOS70
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βυζαντινή περίοδο. Ιδιαίτερα τα Στρατηγήµατα του Πολυαίνου αποτέλεσαν
αντικείµενο πολλών σταχυολογήσεων τόσο της ύστερης ρωµακής όσο και
της µέσης βυζαντινής περιόδου. Φαίνεται ότι ο συγκεκριµένος αυτοκράτορας
και τα µέλη της στρατιωτικής αριστοκρατίας της περιόδου, µε αυτό τον
τρόπο είχαν άριστη γνώση των αρχαίων στρατιωτικών ιστορικών και
αρκετών αρχαίων αποσπασµάτων στρατιωτικού ενδιαφέροντος, πέρα από
τη µελέτη των βυζαντινών στρατηγικών εγχειριδίων (τα οποία άλλωστε σε
συντριπτικό βαθµό στηρίζονταν σε αρχαία στρατηγικά και αποσπάσµατα
στρατιωτικών πραγµατειών).
Ο µεγάλος βαθµός εξάρτησης των Βυζαντινών από τα στρατιωτικά
εγχειρίδια και πραγµατείες ήταν ήδη γνωστός· αυτό που εντυπωσιάζει είναι
η έκταση που είχε. Για κάθε πιθανό και απίθανο στρατιωτικό συµβάν, κατά
τη διάρκεια µίας µάχης ή µίας εκστρατείας, οι Βυζαντινοί ήταν εξοπλισµένοι
µε γραπτές οδηγίες από τις οποίες σπανίως παρέκκλιναν. Οι υψηλόβαθµοι
βυζαντινοί στρατιωτικοί εκείνης της περιόδου, είχαν στη διάθεσή τους µία
εξαιρετική στρατιωτική βιβλιογραφία στρατηγικών και τεχνασµάτων, την
οποία χρησιµοποιούσαν ώστε να διεξάγουν τις πολεµικές τους επιχειρήσεις
µε τους πλέον ευνοκούς, για τους ίδιους, όρους.
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